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Abstract
At its inception, the idea of  civilization was imbued with a sense of  progress, 
peace, and optimism. The historical record, however, belies much of  this sense of  
optimism. Somewhat paradoxically, civilization has come to be closely associated 
with conflict and conquest. In the two-hundred-and-sixty years since the term was 
coined, many things have been done in the name of  civilization; sadly, among them 
are such grave matters as war, conquest, and colonialism.
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En nombre de la civilización: guerra, 
conquista y colonialismo
Resumen
En su concepción, la idea de civilización estuvo atravesada por un sentido de 
progreso, paz y optimismo. No obstante, el archivo histórico contradice en gran 
medida este sentido de optimismo. De manera paradójica, la civilización ha llegado 
a estar estrechamente vinculada con conflictos y conquistas. En los doscientos 
sesenta años desde que el término fue acuñado, muchos actos se han realizado en 
nombre de la civilización; lamentablemente, éstos han incluido cosas tan graves 
como la guerra, la conquista y el colonialismo.
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Introduction
On the reverse side of  the Victory Medal, also known as the Inter-Allied Victory 
Medal, which was awarded to many of  those who served in the First World War are 
inscribed the words: “THE GREAT WAR FOR CIVILISATION 1914-1919.1” 
Eighty years on from the “war to end all wars”2, then United States President, George 
W. Bush, responded to the terrorist attacks of  September 11, 2001 by declaring a 
“war on terror” that is “civilization’s fight” or a “struggle for civilization”3. When 
we consider the notion of  the “burden of  civilization” and all that has been done in 
its name4, one has to ask: How did the idea of  civilization–so often thought of  in a 
positive light, particularly by its many European advocates, despite their often less-
than-civilized methods in advancing civilization–come to be so closely associated, 
perhaps even synonymous for some, with conflict and conquest? Walter Benjamin 
poignantly illustrated this point when he noted that there “is no document of  
civilization which is not at the same time a document of  barbarism”5.
The concept of  civilization occupies a particularly prominent and complicated 
place in the history of  ideas. Its place in world history more generally is even more 
complicated, as alluded to above. The significance of  the idea of  civilization is 
captured by the French linguist, Émile Benveniste, when he declares it to be “one of  
the most important terms in our modern lexicon.”  He further describes civilization 
as one of  a small number of  “essential words” or ideas intimately connected to the 
“whole history of  modern thought and the principal intellectual achievements in 
the Western world”6. Benveniste is essentially right in that civilization is a distinctly 
Western idea, but it must be noted that it has also had a significant impact in the 
non-Western world, particularly in relation to the notion of  the burden or sacred 
trust of  civilization.
This gives us a clue as to why civilization has something of  a dark side, so to 
speak. John Maynard Keynes was on to something when he argued that the “ideas 
1  The medal was issued by more than a dozen countries, including Cuba, the Spanish 
inscription reads: “LA GRAN GUERRA POR LA CIVILIZACIÓN.” Robert Fisk took the 
inscription for the title of his book, The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East 
(New York: Vintage, 2007).
2  See H. G. Wells, The War That Will End War (London: Frank & Cecil Palmer, 1914).
3  See “Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush 2001-2008”, consulted in January 2018, 
available at https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/
Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf.
4  See Brett Bowden, “‘Poisons disguised with honey’: European Expansion and the Sacred 
Trust of Civilization,” The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms 18, no. 2 (2013).
5  Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 256.
6  Emile Benveniste, “Civilization: A Contribution to the History of the Word,” in Problems in 
General Linguistics, Mary Elizabeth Meek trans. (Coral Gables FL: University of Miami Press, 
1971), 289. 
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of  economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they 
are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.” As he added, “soon 
or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil”7. 
Whether it is ideas associated with Marxism-Leninism, responsible for the deaths 
of  untold millions in revolutions gone awry, or expansionist liberalism in the guise 
of  colonialism, the consequences of  ideas and the language that accompanies them 
reverberate well beyond the realm of  abstract theory and the ivory tower–they can 
have a very real impact on actions and outcomes. As Heinrich Heine, the German 
writer and poet pithily observed: “The thought precedes the deed as the lightning 
the thunder”8.
A century-and-a-quarter later, Isaiah Berlin pointed out in his essay “Two 
Concepts of  Liberty,” how Heine had warned the French in the early 1830s “not to 
underestimate the power of  ideas: philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of  
a professor’s study could destroy a civilization”9. Berlin might well have added that 
the idea of  civilization itself  is one of  those powerful concepts; as is the language 
of  civilization more generally. The ideal of  civilization, or the norm of  civilization, 
along with antithetical terms such as barbarism and savagery, have long been used 
and manipulated by powerful political and cultural figures to explain, rationalize, 
and justify decisions and actions that have shaped the course of  history. 
When the French historian and statesman, François Guizot, set out to describe 
the characteristic features of  European civilization, he did so in a generally positive 
manner, noting that 
the first fact comprised in the word civilization (…) is the fact of  progress, 
of  development; it presents at once the idea of  a people marching onward, 
not to change its place, but to change its condition; of  a people whose 
culture is conditioning itself, and ameliorating itself. The idea of  progress, 
of  development, appears to me the fundamental idea contained in the word, 
civilization10.
In celebrating literature, the sciences, and the arts, Guizot declared: “Wherever [hu]
mankind beholds these great signs, these signs glorified by human nature, wherever 
it sees created these treasures of  sublime enjoyment, it there recognizes and names 
civilization.” Similar to others before him, Guizot identified “Two facts” as integral 
7  John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: 
MacMillan and Co., 1936), 383-84.
8  Heinrich Heine, Religion and Philosophy in Germany: A Fragment, trans. John Snodgrass 
(London: Trübner & Co., 1882), 160.
9  Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), 119.
10  François Guizot, The History of Civilization in Europe, William Hazlitt trans. (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, [1828] 1997), 16; emphasis in original.
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elements to the “great fact” that is civilization: “the development of  social activity, 
and that of  individual activity; the progress of  society and the progress of  humanity.” 
Wherever these “two symptoms” are present, “[hu]mankind with loud applause 
proclaims civilization”11.
Following Guizot’s proclamation it was another French historian, Lucien Febvre, 
who stated that the word and idea of  “Civilisation was born at the right time.” “Above 
all,” he added, “it was born at a time when, emerging from the entire Encyclopédie, 
the great concept of  rational and experimental science was beginning to make itself  
felt, constituting a whole in its methods and procedures”12. The air of  enthusiasm 
surrounding the newly born concept of  civilization and the general atmosphere it 
engendered at the time is captured by Febvre in an unidentified citation he quotes 
from the work of  the Belgian scholar, Albert Counson: “Civilisation is inspired by 
a new philosophy of  nature and of  man. Its philosophy of  nature is evolution. Its 
philosophy of  man is perfectibility”13.
This enthusiasm for the idea of  civilization gives very few hints to the doubts and 
darker side that would come to be associated with the concept. The Swiss literary 
critic, Jean Starobinski, would later forcefully articulate the dangers associated with 
this philosophy of  perfectibility and the deification of  civilization more generally. 
He asserted: 
[B]ecause of  the connection with the ideas of  perfectibility and progress, the 
word civilization denoted more than just a complex process of  refinement and 
mores, social organization, technical progress, and advancing knowledge; 
it took on a sacred aura, owing to which it could sometimes reinforce 
traditional religious values and at other times supplant them. The history of  
the word civilization thus leads to this crucial observation: once a notion takes 
on a sacred authority and thereby acquires the power to mobilize, it quickly 
stirs up conflict between political groups or rival schools of  thought claiming 
to be its champions and defenders and as such insisting on the exclusive right 
to propagate the new idea14. 
11  Ibid., 18.
12  Lucien Febvre, “Civilisation: evolution of a word and a group of ideas,” in A New Kind of 
History: from the writings of Febvre, Peter Burke ed., K. Folca trans. (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1973), 229-230; emphasis in original.
13  Ibid., 230.
14 Jean Starobinski, “The Word Civilization,” in Blessings in Disguise; or The Morality of Evil, Arthur 
Goldhammer trans. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 17; emphasis in original.
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Starobinski went on to highlight some of  the consequences of  this situation, one of  
which is his prescient warning that a “term fraught with sacred content demonizes 
its antonym.” He continued:
Once the word civilization ceases to denote a fact subject to judgement and 
becomes an incontestable value, it enters the verbal arsenal of  praise and 
blame. Evaluating the defects and merits of  the civilization is no longer the 
issue. Civilization itself  becomes the crucial criterion: judgement is now 
made in the name of  civilization. One has to take its side, adopt its cause. 
For those who answer its call it becomes ground for praise. Or, conversely, 
it can serve as a basis for denunciation: all that is not civilization, all that 
resists or threatens civilization, is monstrous, absolute evil. As rhetoric heats 
up it becomes legitimate to ask for the supreme sacrifice in the name of  
civilization. This means that the service or defence of  civilization can in 
certain circumstances justify the recourse to violence. Civilization’s enemies, 
the barbarians, if  they cannot be educated or converted, must be prevented 
from doing harm15. 
As noted at the outset, violence on a grand scale in the name of  civilization has been 
something of  a recurring theme throughout much of  recent history. As Starobinski 
went on to note, the demands of  civilization effectively became a “justification for 
colonization” as the “sacred value of  civilization supplanted that of  religion”16. 
Before discussing the relationship between civilization and colonialism in more 
detail, it is worth first taking a closer look at the concept of  civilization.
Civilization and Its Implications
I have discussed the origins and meanings of  the term civilization at length elsewhere, 
so will not go into too much detail here17. Once coined, an initial concern with the 
concept of  civilization gave way to detailed studies of  civilizations in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, in large part instigated by the foundation and development of  
the fields of  anthropology and ethnography. Such a shift led to claims that a broader 
concern with the normative-evaluative aspects of  civilization had “lost some of  its 
15  Starobinski, “The Word Civilization”, 29-30; emphasis in original.
16  Ibid., 18.
17  See Brett Bowden, “The Ideal of Civilisation: Its Origins and Socio-Political Character,” 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 7, no. 1 (2004): 25-50; The Empire of 
Civilization: the Evolution of an Imperial Idea (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
2009); Bowden ed., Civilization: Critical Concepts in Political Science, 4 volumes (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2009), vol. 1.
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cachet”18. The result of  this shift was a preoccupation with narrow definitions such 
as that offered by Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, who state that a “civilization 
constitutes a kind of  moral milieu encompassing a certain number of  nations, each 
national culture being only a particular form of  the whole”19.
One of  the leading and most influential exponents of  the comparative study 
of  civilizations was the historian Arnold Toynbee. In his Study of  History as well as 
in related works, however, he did not completely set aside the ideal of  civilization, 
for he stated that “civilizations have come and gone, but Civilization (with a big 
‘C’) has succeeded” or endured20. Toynbee also sought to articulate a link between 
“civilizations in the plural and civilization in the singular,” noting that the former 
refers to “particular historical exemplifications of  the abstract idea of  civilization.” 
This abstract idea of  civilization is what Toynbee referred to as the “spiritual terms” 
of  the idea which “equate civilization with a state of  society in which there is a 
minority of  the population, however small, that is free from the task, not merely 
of  producing food, but of  engaging in any other of  the economic activities–e.g. 
industry and trade–that have to be carried on to keep the life of  the society going on 
the material plane at the civilizational level”21.
Toynbee’s line of  argument concerning the organization of  society as marked 
by the specialization of  skills, the move toward elite professions and the effective use 
of  leisure time is one that has long been held in connection with the advancement 
of  civilization and civilized society. It is found in the work of  Thomas Hobbes, for 
instance, for although he preceded the term civilization, Robert Kraynak argues 
that “the primary theme of  Hobbes’ studies in civil history is the distinction between 
barbarism and civilization.” Hobbes is said to equate the “political characteristics” of  
“‘commonwealths,’ ‘cities,’ or ‘polities’” with their “civilized qualities,” such as “‘civil 
society’ or ‘civil life’,” to the extent that “he regards civilization as a condition which 
combined a certain level of  political development and a certain manner of  living”22. 
This is suggested in Hobbes’ assertion that the “procuring of  the necessities of  life 
(…) was impossible, till the erecting of  great Common-wealths,” which are “the 
mother of  Peace, and Leasure,” which is, in turn, “the mother of  Philosophy (…) Where 
18  Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: 
Simon & Schuster, 1997), 41.
19  Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, “Note on the Notion of Civilization,” Social Research 38, 
no. 4 (1971): 811.
20  Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), 24.
21  Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, revised and abridged edition (London: Thames & 
Hudson and Oxford University Press, 1972), 44-45. Toynbee’s use of the term spirit (Geist) 
invokes the distinction often identified in Germanic or Romantic thinking in discussions of 
Kultur vs Civilization; see Bowden, “The Ideal of Civilisation” in The Empire of Civilization, 
chapter two.
22  Robert P. Kraynak, “Hobbes on Barbarism and Civilization,” The Journal of Politics 45, no. 1 
(1983): 90; emphasis in original.
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first were great and flourishing Cities, there was first the study of  Philosophy”23. That is 
to say: “Wherever government is sufficiently strong and well-established to provide 
peace and leisure, men began to cultivate the finer things in life”24; the very things 
that are said to be the outward expression of  civilization, such as literature and 
the arts. In “contrast, savagery or barbarism has been a condition where political 
authority was developed insufficiently or non-existent”25. Kraynak concludes that by 
Hobbes’ account, “civilization has been distinguished from barbarism by the power 
and sufficiency of  political authority, the enjoyment of  leisure, and the development 
of  philosophy or the arts and sciences.” But, it is the first of  these hallmarks of  
civilization, the presence of  increasingly complex socio-political organization, 
which, in the first instance at least, is the prerequisite and facilitator of  the latter 
qualities.
Some semblance of  this general line of  argument has been made time and 
again throughout history, its influence ebbing and flowing with the times. One of  
the earliest to do so was Aristotle in The Politics, in which he posited that “society 
[meaning the polis or state] (…) contains in itself  (…) the end and perfection of  
government: first founded that we might live, but continued that we may live 
happily”26. On this point, Kraynak argues that for “Aristotle and other classical 
philosophers the good life is the end or purpose of  civilization”27. That said, not 
everyone would agree that it is possible, or desirable, to apply terms likes civilization 
in such an anachronistic fashion. While Aristotle’s conception of  society might differ 
from contemporary usage, what this is in effect saying is that the realization of  the 
good life is the purpose of  government. Furthermore, it is only by living in society 
with others that this might be achieved, for Aristotle insists, “whosoever is (…) 
unfit for society, must be either inferior or superior to man.” He further singles out 
“the man in Homer, who is reviled for being ‘without society, without law, without 
family’”28. for, in effect, the absence of  at least the first two of  these institutions 
means he is without civilization. Instead, he is either savage or barbaric, or a god. 
Such accounts of  the relationship between civilization, society, and government fit 
with Anthony Pagden’s claim that the “philosophical history of  civilization was, 
then, a history of  progressive complexity and progressive refinement which followed 
from the free expression of  those faculties which men possess only as members of  
a community”29.
23  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, [1651] 1985), 
Ch. 46, 683; emphasis in original.
24  Kraynak, “Hobbes on Barbarism and Civilization,” 90-91.
25  Ibidem.
26  Aristotle, The Politics, (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1912), 3, para. 1252b.
27  Kranyak, “Hobbes on Barbarism and Civilization,” 93.
28  Aristotle, The Politics, 4-5, 1253a.
29  Anthony Pagden, “The ‘defence of civilization’ in eighteenth-century social theory,” History of 
the Human Sciences 1, no. 1 (1988): 39.
Pléyade 23 / enero-junio (2019) online issn 0719-3696 issn 0718-655X / pp. 73-100 / 81
Brett Bowden
In a 1940 lecture titled “What ‘Civilization’ Means,” R. G. Collingwood spoke 
of  three elements of  civilization: economic civilization, social civilization, and 
legal civilization. The realm of  economic civilization is marked not simply by the 
pursuit of  riches–which might in fact be inimical to economic civilization–but by 
“the civilized pursuit of  wealth.” The pursuit of  wealth is in turn carried out in two 
ways: through “civilized exchange” and “civilized production.” The former means 
that exchange is carried out justly and fairly in the absence of  domination, such as 
master-slave relationships (which puts him at odds with Aristotle), in accordance 
with the principles of  laissez-faire economics. The latter, “Civilized production is 
scientific production.” It is production that is carried out “intelligently” such that 
“productive industry [is] controlled by an understanding of  natural laws.” That is 
to say, it is a mode of  production that employs the practice of  “natural science (…) 
wherein, by means of  experiment and observation, men find out how to use the 
forces of  nature to the advancement of  their own welfare”30. 
The second of  Collingwood’s three elements of  civilization is “social civilization”: 
it is the forum in which humankind’s sociability is thought to be satisfied by “the idea 
of  joint action,” or what we might call community. It bears the name “civilization” 
because it is said to have been “civilized” to the point wherein its members refrain 
from the threat and use of  both physical and moral force to induce fellow members 
to do “what [t]he[y] want them to do,” instead employing methods of  persuasion to 
win them over. Completing Collingwood’s tripartite definition of  civilization is the 
legal component. The final mark of  civilization is “a society governed by law,” and 
not so much by criminal law but by civil law in particular, “the law in which claims are 
adjusted between its members.” Furthermore, while military and ecclesiastical law 
may well have their respective places in such a society, those places are subordinate 
to the role played by civil law. Moreover, a “society thus governed by civil law is 
one in which there is no arbitrary power; no executive, however constituted, able 
to override the law and no judicature able to defy it”31. For Collingwood, then, 
“[c]ivilization is something which happens to a community (…). Civilization is a process 
of  approximation to an ideal state”32. In essence, what Collingwood is arguing is that 
civilized society–and thus civilization itself–is guided by and operates according to 
the principles of  the rule of  law. 
When we combine the collective criteria of  Collingwood’s tripartite components 
of  civilization: economic civilization, social civilization, and legal civilization, what 
they amount to is what I would call socio-political civilization, or the capacity of  a 
collective to organize and govern itself  under some system of  laws or constitution. 
Not too far removed from Collingwood’s concern with the elimination of  physical 
30  R. G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan, ed. David Boucher (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 
502-508.
31  Ibid., 502-511, quote at 510.
32  Ibid., 283; emphasis in original.
82 / Pléyade 23 / enero-junio (2019) online issn 0719-3696 issn 0718-655X / pp. 73-100
In the Name of Civilization: War, Conquest, and Colonialism 
and moral force via “social civilization” are the more recent accounts of  civilized 
society that address issues relating to the historical and ongoing endeavor to 
manage violence, if  only by removing it from the public sphere. Such a concern is 
extended in Zygmunt Bauman’s account of  civilization to the more general issue 
of  producing readily governable subjects. The “concept of  civilization,” he argues, 
“entered learned discourse in the West as the name of  a conscious proselytizing 
crusade waged by men of  knowledge and aimed at extirpating the vestiges of  wild 
cultures”33. 
The nature of  the “proselytizing crusade” in the name of  civilization is one of  
the key concerns herein. Its rationale or driving force is not too difficult to determine 
when one considers Starobinski’s assertion: “Taken as a value, civilization constitutes 
a political and moral norm. It is the criterion against which barbarity, or non-
civilization, is judged and condemned”34. A similar point is made by Pagden who 
states that civilization “describes a state, social, political, cultural, aesthetic–even 
moral and physical–which is held to be the optimum condition for all mankind, 
and this involves the implicit claim that only the civilized can know what it is to be 
civilized”35. It is out of  this implicit claim and the judgements passed in its name that 
the notion of  the sacred trust or burden of  civilization was born. 
The argument that only the civilized know what it means to be civilized is 
an important one, for as Starobinski notes, the “historical moment in which the 
word civilization appears marks the advent of  self-reflection, the emergence of  
consciousness that thinks it understands the nature of  its own activity.” More 
specifically, it marks “the moment that Western civilization becomes aware of  
itself  reflectively, it sees itself  as one civilization among others. Having achieved 
self-consciousness, civilization immediately discovers civilizations”36. But as Norbert 
Elias notes, it is not a case of  Western civilization being just one amongst equals, 
for the very concept of  civilization “expresses the self-consciousness of  the West (…) 
It sums up everything in which Western society of  the last two or three centuries 
believes itself  superior to earlier societies or ‘more primitive’ contemporary ones.” 
Elias further explains that in using the term civilization: “Western society seeks to 
describe what constitutes its special character and what it is proud of: the level of  its 
technology, the nature of  its manners, the development of  its scientific knowledge or 
view of  the world, and much more”37. With this in mind, it is not too difficult to see 
how the harbingers of  civilization might gravitate toward a “proselytizing crusade” 
33  Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters: On modernity, post-modernity and intellectuals 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 93; emphasis in original. 
34  Starobinski, “The Word Civilization,” 31.
35  Pagden, “The ‘defence of civilization’ in eighteenth-century social theory,” 33. 
36  Starobinski, “The Word Civilization”, 32; emphasis in original.
37  Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, Edmund Jephcott trans. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 5; 
emphasis in original.
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driven, at least in part, by what were sometimes good intentions and a deeply held 
belief  in the burden of  civilization. 
The issue is not only the denial of  the value and achievements of  other 
civilizations38, but the implication that they are in near irreversible decline. From 
this perspective, their contribution to “big C” Civilization (if  any is acknowledged) 
is seen as largely limited to the past, out of  which comes the further implication that 
if  anything of  value is to be retrieved, it cannot be done so without the assistance of  
a more civilized tutor. Such thinking is only too evident, for example, in Ferdinand 
Schiller’s mistaken claim that “the peoples of  India appear to care very little for 
history and have never troubled to compile it”39. Hence, the British took it upon 
themselves to compile such uneven accounts, as that which was prepared by James 
Mill and published as The History of  British India in 1817. Despite never having visited 
India, Mill’s History, an attack on William Robertson’s Historical Disquisition of  1791, 
relayed to European audiences an equally mistaken image of  Indian civilization as 
eternally backward and undeveloped40.
It is worth noting here that civilization is a concept that Quentin Skinner would 
describe as an “evaluative-descriptive” term in that it is used both to describe and 
evaluate; or pass judgement in the very act of  describing. The nature of  such concepts 
is that they can be used to either commend or condemn the actions or peoples they 
are used to describe, often with serious consequences. Skinner, considered a pioneer 
of  the Cambridge School method, calls an “evaluative-descriptive” concept one 
“which perform[s] evaluative as well as descriptive functions in natural languages” 41. The 
“special characteristic” of  such concepts is that “they have a standard application 
to perform one of  two contrasting ranges of  speech-acts. They are available, that is, 
to perform such acts as commending (and expressing and soliciting approval) or else 
of  condemning (and expressing and soliciting disapproval) of  any action or state of  
affairs they are used to describe”42. 
38  See Brett Bowden, “The River of Inter-civilisational Relations: the Ebb and Flow of Peoples, 
Ideas and Innovations,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 7 (2007): 1359-1374.
39  Friedrich C. S. Schiller, “Introduction,” in Civilisation or Civilisations: An Essay in the Spenglerian 
Philosophy of History, E. H. Goddard and P. A. Gibbons eds. (London: Constable & Company, 
1926), vii.
40  See Ranajit Guha, History at the Limit of World-History (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002).
41  Quentin Skinner, “Rhetoric and Conceptual Change,” Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought 3 
(1999): 61; “Language and Social Change,” in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His 
Critics, James Tully ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 122.
42  Skinner, “Rhetoric and Conceptual Change,” 61.
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Racial Hierarchy and Standards of Civilization
In 1910, a French advocate of  colonialism named Jules Harmand argued that it 
was necessary to accept as a principle and point of  departure the fact that there 
is a hierarchy of  races and civilizations, and that we [Europeans/Westerners] 
belong to the superior race and civilization, still recognizing that, while superiority 
confers rights, it imposes strict obligations in return.” He further contended that the 
“legitimation of  conquest over native peoples is the conviction of  our superiority, 
not merely our mechanical, economic, and military superiority, but our moral 
superiority.” Harmand thought that our dignity and the dignity of  the enterprise 
“rests on that quality, and it underlies our right to direct the rest of  humanity43.
To this day, questions of  imperialism continue to revolve around claims to 
some measure of  superiority and the notion of  a hierarchy of  civilizations, races, 
states, or whatever the particular collective in question might be. Just as important 
is the persistence of  the related idea that humanity universally progresses along 
an evolutionary path from savagery through barbarism to culminate in the exalted 
status of  civilization. Throughout much of  history, it was Europeans who saw 
themselves as representing the highest stage of  that process, and it was a condition 
that other peoples at various stages of  arrested development were encouraged to 
aspire to through tutelage and training. In more recent times, it is the United States 
that is held up as the shining light of  progress and civilization, while countless other 
states and peoples are characterized as underdeveloped or falling short of  modernity. 
Whoever holds the mantel, part and parcel of  self-perceptions of  superiority is the 
self-conferred responsibility that comes with seeing one’s self  as at the peak of  
civilization: the sacred trust of  civilization; or the duty to civilize those deemed as 
savage or barbaric, underdeveloped, or pre-modern.
In a similar vein, standards of  civilization remain an explicit tool of  hierarchy, 
separating those admitted to the international society of  states from those deemed 
unworthy and denied entry, at least until they can measure up. As the term standard 
suggests in many contexts, standards of  civilization are largely about widely 
accepted norms and expectations, or the norm; in this case, what is required in 
terms of  perceptions about civilized behaviour. The following definition draws on 
an encyclopedia entry I wrote some thirteen years ago, and not much has changed 
since then44. A standard of  civilization is a means historically used in international 
law to distinguish between civilized and uncivilized nations or peoples in order to 
43  Jules Harman as quoted in Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1994), 17.
44  Brett Bowden, ‘Standard of Civilisation’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of International Relations 
and Global Politics, Martin Griffiths ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 776-778. The 
most detailed account remains Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International 
Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
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determine membership in the international society of  states. The concept entered 
international legal texts and practice in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
under the influence of  anthropologists and ethnologists who drew distinctions 
between civilized, barbarian, and savage peoples based on their respective capacities 
for socio-political cooperation and organization. Operating primarily during the 
European colonial period, and sometimes referred to as the classical standard of  
civilization, it was a legal mechanism designed to set the benchmark for the ascent 
of  non-European nations to the ranks of  the civilized society of  states. Membership 
in international society conferred full sovereignty upon a state entitling it to full 
recognition and protection under international law.
The general test of  whether a nation was deemed civilized revolved around 
its degree of  socio-political organization and capacity for self-government in 
accordance with accepted European standards. A civilized state required: a) basic 
institutions of  government and public bureaucracy; b) organizational capacity 
for self-defense; c) published legal code and adherence to the rule of  law; and d) 
recognition of  international law and norms, including those on the conduct of  
war and diplomatic exchange. If  a nation could meet these requirements, it was 
generally deemed to be a legitimate sovereign state entitled to full recognition as an 
international personality. In essence, a government had to be sufficiently stable to 
allow it to enter into binding commitments under international law, and possess the 
will and capacity to guarantee the life, liberty and property of  members of  foreign 
civilized states living and operating within its borders. 
The inability of  many non-European societies to meet these criteria, and the 
concomitant legal distinction that separated them from civilized societies, led to the 
unequal treaty system of  capitulations. The right of  extraterritoriality, as it was also 
known, regulated relations between sovereign civilized states and quasi-sovereign 
uncivilized states in regard to their respective rights over, and obligations to, the 
citizens of  civilized states living and operating in countries where capitulations 
were in force. In much of  the non-European world, particularly in Asia, the Middle 
East and sub-Saharan Africa, this system of  capitulations incrementally escalated 
to the point that it became the large-scale civilizing missions that in turn became 
colonialism45.
Drawing a distinction between civilized and uncivilized peoples was an article of  
faith that went largely unchallenged in the West until the mid-twentieth century. Not 
45  See, for instance, Pär Kristoffer Cassel, Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial 
Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012). Capitulations by the Ottoman Empire in their dealings with various European powers 
in the fifteenth century are among the first example of such formal legal arrangements. The 
Treaty of Nanking, imposed by the British on China in 1842 following the end of the First 
Opium War, is one of the better-known instances of foreign interference in, and exemptions 
from, local legal jurisdiction.
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so long ago, our world was thought to be reasonably neatly divided between savage, 
barbarian, and civilized peoples. In 1877, Lewis Henry Morgan wrote: “It can now 
be asserted upon convincing evidence that savagery preceded barbarism in all tribes 
of  mankind, as barbarism is known to have preceded civilization”46. The idea that 
one preceded the other and that the “three distinct conditions are connected with 
each other in a natural as well as necessary sequence of  progress”47. is deeply related 
to the notion of  a universal history of  humankind48. The distinction was not limited 
to anthropology, also finding expression in law and politics, such as James Lorimer’s 
claim: “As a political phenomenon, humanity, in its present condition, divides itself  
into three concentric zones or spheres–that of  civilised humanity, that of  barbarous 
humanity, and that of  savage humanity”49.
The rationale underpinning the emergence of  the classical standard of  
civilization is captured by Georg Schwarzenberger: 
Once civilisation is related to the basic types of  human association, it is no 
longer necessary to be content with the mere enumeration and description 
of  a bewildering number of  civilisations. It is then possible to evaluate and 
to measure individual civilisations in the light of  a universally applicable 
test of  the degree of  civilisation which any such particular endeavour has 
attained50.
While standards of  civilization might appear to be a reasonably innocuous 
principle, in effect, legal distinctions between civilized and uncivilized peoples and 
the unavoidable interactions between them gave rise to the unequal treaty system 
and the right of  extraterritoriality. As Charles Alexandrowicz noted:
International law shrank into a Euro-centric system which imposed on extra-
European countries its own ideas.” As an article of  international law, the 
classical standard privileged the place of  Europe-cum-Western civilization 
as it “discriminated against non-European civilisations and thus ran on 
parallel lines with colonialism as a political trend 51.
46  Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1964), 5.
47  Ibid., 11.
48  See Brett Bowden, The Strange Persistence of Universal History in Political Thought (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
49  James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations, II Vols. (Edinburgh and London: William 
Blackwood and Sons, 1883), I, 101.
50  Georg Schwarzenberger, “The Standard of Civilisation in International Law,” in Current Legal 
Problems, George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger eds. (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 
1955), 218-219.
51  Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, The European-African Confrontation: A Study in Treaty Making 
(Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1973), 6.
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This is why there is some weight to claims about the chequered past of  standards of  
civilization in international law and international society.
Expanding Civilization through Colonization
In the seventeenth century, Juan de Solórzano Pereira cited both Juan Ginés de 
Sepúlveda and Francisco de Vitoria’s De Indiarum Iure to further legitimize Spanish 
occupation and possession of  land in the New World. In essence, the Spanish 
had relied on papal authority to justify their role in the Americas, for as early as 
1493, Alexander VI’s papal bull Inter caetera relied on Columbus’s observations of  
natives “going unclothed” to take responsibility for their salvation. Despite their 
nakedness, he deemed them “sufficiently disposed to embrace the Catholic faith and 
be trained in good morals.” Thus, the “process of  Christianizing” the Amerindians 
under Spanish control and care was thought to “precede the process of  civilizing 
them”52. In effect, civilization was not attainable without Christianity, Catholicism 
in particular.
By this time, the English were also making their own claims on parcels of  the 
New World, but in this case they appealed to an even higher authority. In 1620, 
King James I authorized a Patent for the Council of  New England which stated that 
“within these late Yeares there hath by God’s Visitation raigned a wonderfull Plague, 
together with many horrible Slaughters, and Murhters, committed amoungst 
the Savages and bruitish People . . . to the utter Destruction, Devastacion, and 
Depopulacion of  that whole Territorye53.
This “wonderful plague” was all part of  God’s master plan, favouring the 
English as He did with “his Mercie and Favour, and by his Powerful Arme,” such 
that the land in question, “deserted as it were by their naturall Inhabaitants, should 
be possessed and enjoyed by such our Subjects and People”54. Whereas the Spanish 
claims to the New World rested on the authority of  God’s Vicar in Rome, English 
claims to occupation and possession cut out the middle-man, so to speak, and called 
directly on the authority of  God.
God’s will aside, the degree of  indigenous occupation and usage of  land became 
a significant factor in the European usurpation of  newly discovered territories. One 
of  the most influential figures on this issue was John Locke. Locke was more than 
just a political philosopher and man of  ideas, taking an active role in colonial policy 
as co-author, with the Earl of  Shaftesbury, of  the Fundamental Constitutions of  
52  Pope Alexander VI, quoted in James Muldoon, The Americas in the Spanish World Order: The 
Justification for Conquest in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1994), 40.
53  “Patent for the Council of New England” of 1620, quoted in Muldoon, Ibid., 38.
54  Ibidem.
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Carolina. Locke also served as secretary of  the Council of  Trade and Plantations 
from 1673 to 1675. While he was opposed to Spanish-style conquest, Locke was of  
the view that “where there being more Land, than the inhabitants possess, and make 
use of  any one has liberty to make use of  the waste”55. From Locke’s perspective, 
this was widely the case in the New World, for he wondered
whether in the wild woods and uncultivated wast[e] of  America left to 
Nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres 
will yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniences of  life 
as ten acres of  equally fertile land doe in Devonshire where they are well 
cultivated?56.
Therefore, if  the natives were not going to till, sow, and reap the land in European 
fashion, then the English were perfectly entitled to do so, and having mixed their 
labor with the land, they were then also entitled to take possession of  it.
The influence of  such thinking is evident in the philosopher-jurist Emmerich 
de Vattel’s musings on “the discovery of  the New World” and “whether a Nation 
may lawfully occupy any part of  a vast territory in which are to be found only 
wandering tribes.” Vattel asserts that “cultivation of  the soil [is] (…) an obligation 
imposed upon man by nature,” therefore it is against the laws of  nature that there 
are peoples “who, in order to avoid labour, seek to live upon their flocks and the 
fruits of  the chase”57. Peoples “who still pursue this idle mode of  life occupy more 
land than they would have need of  under a system of  honest labour, and they may 
not complain if  other more industrious Nations, too confined at home, should come 
and occupy part of  their lands”58. In Vattel’s thinking, the Amerindians were not 
properly utilizing the vast lands but merely “roamed over” rather than “inhabited” 
the land, their “uncertain occupancy” was deemed not “a real and lawful taking of  
possession.” Thus, Europeans permitted themselves to “lawfully take possession of  
them and establish colonies in them”59.
Such thinking remained influential for centuries to come, as can be seen in the 
writing of  the Italian jurist Pasquale Fiore, who later argued that, “as a matter of  
principle, colonization and colonial expansion cannot be questioned”60. For it is 
55  John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New York: New American Library, 1965), 439, Book 
II, Sect. 184, emphasis in original; Barbara Arneil, “Trade, Plantations, and Property: John 
Locke and the Economic Defense of Colonialism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 55, no. 4 (1994): 
591-609.
56  Locke, Two Treatises, Book II, 336. 
57  Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, trans. Charles G. 
Fenwick (New York: Oceana Publications for the Carnegie Institute, 1964), 85.
58  Ibid., 37-38.
59  Ibidem.
60  Pasquale Fiore, International Law Codified and its Legal Sanction (New York: Baker, Voorhis and 
Company, 1918), 46.
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entirely appropriate “that civilized countries, in order to find new outlets for their 
ever increasing activity, need to extend their present possessions and to occupy those 
parts of  the earth which are not of  any use to uncivilized peoples”61. Fiore goes on to 
write “that the earth is in general designed to serve the needs of  everyone and that 
it is not permissible that savages who are unable to derive any profit from natural 
products should be allowed to leave sources of  wealth unproductive, leaving the 
ground uncultivated”62.
In time it was not only the cultivation of  land that Europeans thought themselves 
obliged to undertake, there was also the sacred trust of  civilization. James Lorimer, 
for instance, insisted: “Colonisation, and the reclamation of  barbarians and savages, 
if  possible in point of  fact, are duties morally and jurally inevitable; and where 
circumstances demand the application of  physical force, they fall within necessary 
objects of  war.” The responsibility for upholding this obligation did not necessarily 
fall upon “individual States,” rather, Lorimer thought it best undertaken “by a 
central authority, emanating from the whole body of  recognised and recognising 
States, and that the process of  civilisation should thus become the common task of  
civilised mankind”63. At the time, this effectively meant the international society of  
civilized states was based on Western Europe, and perhaps, begrudgingly, North 
America. In due course it would become the responsibility of  the League of  Nations.
In speaking of  intervention more generally, the French jurist Antoine Rougier argued 
that a “Government which fails in its function by ignoring the human interests of  
the governed commits what may be called a perversion of  its sovereignty.” In the 
absence of  sovereignty, that is, 
when the violations of  the law of  human solidarity occur in the case of  a 
barbarous or half-civilized State, in which the disorders have a durable and 
permanent character, the civilized powers must of  necessity have recourse 
to a more energetic method of  control–a control adapted to prevent the 
wrong-doing rather than to repress it or cause reparation to be made64.
61  Ibidem.
62  Ibid., 120.
63  James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations, 2 vols (Edinburgh and London: William 
Blackwood and Sons, 1883), vol. 2, 28.
64  Antoine Rougier, “La théorie de l’ intervention d’ humanité”, Revue générale de droit international 
public 17 (1910): 495-496, quoted in Alpheus Henry Snow, The Question of Aborigines in the Law 
and Practice of Nations (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, The Knickerbocker Press, 1921), 316-
317. 
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This more energetic method meant that “instead of  the right of  ordinary intervention 
there then arises the right of  permanent intervention,” or colonization65.
The general rationale behind this line of  argument and the driving force 
behind colonial policy are highlighted by another prominent and influential jurist, 
John Westlake. He argued that “wherever the native inhabitants can furnish no 
government” –which he claimed was essentially the case wherever Europeans 
made contact with native peoples–, then “the first necessity is that a government 
should be furnished”66. It was taken for granted that the “inflow of  the white race 
cannot be stopped where there is land to cultivate, ore to be mined, commerce to 
be developed, sport to enjoy, curiosity to be satisfied.” Moreover, if  any so-called 
“fanatical admirer of  savage life argued that the whites ought to be kept out, he 
would only be driven to the same conclusion by another route, for a government on 
the spot would be necessary to keep them out”67. This line of  argument represents 
another example of  circular reasoning, wherein the conquest of  indigenous peoples 
and the usurpation of  their land were inevitable no matter what the rationale.
The idea that organized, well governed, civilized peoples –such as those of  
Europe– generally have an advantage over less organized, ungoverned, uncivilized 
peoples –as most newly discovered natives were characterized– has a long history 
when it comes to matters of  conquest. Georg W. F. Hegel wrote that “it arises above 
all in the Iliad where the Greeks take the field against the Asiatics and thereby 
fight the first epic battles in the tremendous opposition that led to the wars which 
constitute in Greek history a turning-point in world-history.” He continues: 
In a similar way the Cid fights against the Moors; in Tasso and Ariosto the 
Christians fight against the Saracens, in Camoens the Portuguese against 
the Indians. And so in almost all the great epics we see peoples different in 
Morals, religion, speech, in short in mind and surroundings, arrayed against 
one another; and we are made completely at peace by the world-historically 
justified victory of  the higher principle over the lower which succumbs to a 
bravery that leaves nothing over the defeated68.
The conclusion Hegel draws from this is: “In this sense, the epics of  the past describe 
the triumph of  the West over the East, [the triumph] of  European moderation, and 
the individual beauty of  a reason that sets limits to itself ”69. As he writes elsewhere, 
65  Ibidem. A similar line of thinking in respect to sovereignty underpins the more recent 
responsibility to protect principle, or R2P.
66  John Westlake, The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public International Law, L. Oppenheim 
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914), 145.
67  Ibidem.
68  G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, 2 vols, T.M. Knox trans. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1975), vol. 2, 1061.
69  Ibid., 1062.
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the “inner dialectic” of  a civilized society drives it “to push beyond its own limits 
and seek markets” in territories that are “generally backward in industry,” in turn 
generating the “colonizing activity (…) to which the mature civil society is driven”70. 
The conquest of  native peoples therefore, whether the Amerindians in the Americas, 
the Aborigines of  Australia, the Melanesians and Polynesians of  the Pacific, or the 
various peoples of  Africa, are seen as a largely natural and inevitable series of  events 
that conform to patterns in world-history. 
Presenting another side to the argument were anti-imperialists of  the 
Enlightenment-era such as Johann Gottfried Herder, Denis Diderot, and Immanuel 
Kant71. The last of  these thinkers in particular is oft-cited as a champion of  
cosmopolitanism and an avowed anti-imperialist who believed “colonial conquest 
is morally unacceptable”72. Kant wrote in Perpetual Peace that a state “is a society of  
men whom no one else has any right to command or to dispose except the state 
itself.” Furthermore, “to incorporate it into another state, like a graft, is to destroy 
its existence as a moral person, reducing it to a thing”73. He went on to highlight the 
dangers that Europe had brought upon itself  by engaging in such folly. Kant argues 
that ordinarily we “assume that no one may act inimically toward another except 
when he has been actively injured by the other”74. And this assumption is “correct if  
both are under civil law, for, by entering into such a state, they afford each other the 
requisite security through the sovereign which has power over both”75. There are, 
however, exceptions, for Kant’s thoughts on the less civilized races led him to claim: 
“Man (or the people) in the state of  nature deprives me of  this security and injures 
me, if  he is near me, by this mere status of  his, even though he does not injure me 
actively (facto); he does so by the lawlessness of  his condition (statu iniusto) which 
constantly threatens me. Therefore,” he adds, “I can compel him either to enter 
with me into a state of  civil law or to remove himself  from my neighbourhood”76. 
In some ways, then, Kant is not so different from those advocates of  European 
civilizing missions that are designed to elevate the natives from a state of  nature into 
the realms of  law-governed political organization, or civilization. Should this fail, 
or not go according to plan, the same missions become the more violent missions 
70  G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, T.M. Knox trans. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 151, 
para. 246-248.
71  Sankar Muthu, “Enlightenment Anti-Imperialism,” Social Research 66, no. 4 (1999): 959-1007; 
Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
72  Martha C. Nussbaum, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 5, 
no. 1 (1997): 14. Michael Doyle argues that “Kant rejects conquest or imperial intervention as 
(…) wrong.” See Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (1983): 325.
73  Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Kant on History, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, [1795] 1963), 86-87.
74  Ibid., 92, note 1.
75  Ibidem.
76  Ibidem.
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of  conquest that compel the threatening savages to “remove” themselves to a 
neighborhood where they pose less of  a threat to the civilized. 
As Robert van Krieken notes, the civilizing process “is accompanied by 
aggression and violence towards those who remain uncivilized, largely because of  
the threat they pose to the fragility of  the achievements of  civilization.” Equally, 
“it is this aggression which then underlies the associated civilizing offensives77. In 
effect, civilization and the “state monopolization of  violence in fact involved the 
exercise of  that violence on groups seen to lie outside the prevailing standards of  
civilization”78. Just as this can be found in Kant, it is also J. S. Mill who makes 
the point that a “civilized government cannot help having barbarous neighbours”. 
Consequently, and similarly to Kant, he argues that when it does, “it cannot always 
content itself  with a defensive position, one of  mere resistance to aggression.” For 
after an indeterminate but intolerably wary time, almost inevitably “it either finds 
itself  obliged to conquer them, or to assert so much authority over them” so that 
the uncivilized neighbor gradually falls into a state of  dependence on the civilized 
nation. This, Mill insists, accounts for the history and nature of  the relations 
between the British and the “native States of  India,” for he claims that Britain was 
never “secure in its own possessions until it had reduced the military power” of  
neighboring Indian “states to a nullity”79.
According to Mill, such conquests are justified because barbarous nations have 
not progressed “beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their benefit that 
they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners.” The rationale here 
is that the “independence and nationality” essential to the development of  more 
civilized peoples is thought a general “impediment” to the uncivilized. Therefore, 
the “sacred duties which civilized nations owe to the independence and nationality 
of  each other” under the law of  nations are not extended to uncivilized societies, 
for Mill exclaims that “barbarians have no rights as a nation.” As a result of  this 
principle, he insists that the “criticisms, therefore, which are so often made upon the 
conduct of  the French in Algeria, or the English in India,” are in essence based “on 
a wrong principle”80.
Edward Said relates a good example of  these ideas at work in relation to 
Arthur Balfour’s speech to the British House of  Commons of  June 13, 1910, as 
a spirited yet one-sided defense of  the British role in Egypt. It was often the case 
that European conquerors believed that they knew “exotic” civilizations better than 
77  Robert van Krieken, “The barbarism of civilization: cultural genocide and the ‘stolen 
generations’,” British Journal of Sociology 50, no. 2 (1999): 309; emphasis in original. See also 
Brett Bowden, Civilization and War (Cheltenham and Northampton MA: Edward Elgar, 2013).
78  Ibidem.
79  John Stuart Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” in Essays on Politics and Culture, 
Gertrude Himmelfarb ed. (Garden City NY: Doubleday & Company, 1962), 407.
80  Ibid., 406-7; emphasis in original. See also Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, specially Ch. 3, 
“Progress, Civilization, and Consent,” 77-114.
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those people themselves, and were therefore best equipped to act as their overseer. 
Balfour similarly insisted that “we know the civilization of  Egypt better than we 
know the civilization of  any other country. We know it farther back; we know it 
more intimately; we know more about it.” According to Balfour, the well-being of  
Egypt and its people was best entrusted to the hands of  the British. He continued: 
“Western nations as soon as they emerge into history show the beginnings of  those 
capacities for self-government.” But beyond Europe,
one may look through the whole history of  the Orientals (…) and you never 
find traces of  self-government (…) Conqueror has succeeded conqueror; 
one domination has followed another; but never in all the revolutions of  fate 
and fortune have you seen one of  those nations of  its own motion establish 
what we, from a Western point of  view, call self-government. That is the fact.
With that “fact”, Balfour believed that he had more than found a just cause for 
British colonial occupation of  not just Egypt, but the Empire at large. He further 
justified Britain’s moral case for taking up this responsibility by insisting: “We are in 
Egypt not merely for the sake of  the Egyptians, though we are there for their sake; 
we are there also for the sake of  Europe at large”81. According to Alpheus Henry 
Snow, by the end of  the nineteenth century it was “established as a fundamental 
principle of  the law of  nations that aboriginal tribes are the wards of  civilized 
States”82. Thus, colonization and the sacred trust of  civilization were not only for 
the sake of  Europe, but for the sake of  the entire uncivilized world.
Conclusion
In 1787, just thirty years after the word civilization was first published in French, 
Marquis de Condorcet, the embodiment of  Enlightenment ideals, declared in Vie 
de Voltaire: “The more civilization spreads throughout the earth the more we shall 
see war and conquest disappear together with slavery and want”83. Condorcet had 
great faith in the idea of  progress and the direction of  human history, which would 
reveal all the phases through which humankind has passed; “the path that it has 
followed, the steps that it has made towards truth or happiness.” He was convinced 
that civilization and progress “will never be reversed as long as the earth occupies its 
81  Arthur James Balfour, quoted in Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1978), 31-33.
82  Snow, Question of Aborigines, 191.
83  Quoted in Lucien Febvre, “Civilisation: evolution of a word and a group of ideas”, 257, note 
118.
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present place in the system of  the universe, and as long as the general laws of  this 
system” do not produce some form of  cataclysmic event84.
A little less than two years before he was thrust into the presidency of  the United 
States, on the eve of  Christmas 1899, Theodore Roosevelt wrote an article for the 
Independent in which he stated: 
On the border between civilization and barbarism war is generally normal 
because it must be under the conditions of  barbarism. Whether the 
barbarian be the Red Indian on the frontier of  the United States, the Afghan 
on the border of  British India, or the Turkoman who confronts the Siberian 
Cossack, the result is the same. In the long run civilized man finds he can 
keep the peace only by subduing his barbarian neighbor85.
Roosevelt went on to assert: “Every expansion of  civilization makes for peace. In 
other words, every expansion of  a great civilized power means a victory for law, 
order, and righteousness”86.
The year 1899 was significant in the ongoing expansion of  the civilization 
project: the United States formally became a colonial power, taking possession of  
the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. In effect, the United States took 
up Rudyard Kipling’s invitation as extended in his poem, “White Man’s Burden,” 
which was published in February 1899, including in McClure’s Magazine. At the same 
time, Blackwood’s Magazine of  Edinburgh serialized Joseph Conrad’s novella “Heart 
of  Darkness” from February to April, 1899, in which he more than hints at the dark 
side of  the civilization project: 
The conquest of  the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those 
who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is 
not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the 
idea only. An idea at the back of  it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; 
and an unselfish belief  in the idea–something you can set up, and bow down 
before, and offer a sacrifice to”87.
Despite the confidence of  Condorcet, one cannot help but think that there is an 
inherent contradiction or a kind of  paradox associated with the idea of  civilization. 
Despite the positive aura and what might be the best of  intentions, the outcomes are 
84  Antoine-Nicolas de Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, 
June Barraclough trans. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, [1795] 1955), 4-5.
85  Theodore Roosevelt, “Expansion and Peace,” in The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1906), p. 31.
86  Ibidem.
87  Joseph Conrad, “Heart of Darkness,” Blackwood’s Magazine, Feb-Apr, 1899: 193-220, 479-502, 
634-657.
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all too often destructive. As noted in the introduction above, Starobinski eloquently 
highlighted the potential pitfalls associated with the ideas of  civilization, progress, 
and the pursuit human perfectibility. Similarly, as Isaiah Berlin noted in discussing 
the pursuit of  utopian illusions more generally, “to make mankind just and happy 
and creative and harmonious for ever–what could be too high a price to pay for 
that? To make such an omelette, there is surely no limit to the number of  eggs that 
should be broken”88. But the only thing tangible in such impossible pursuits “is the 
reality of  sacrifice, the dying and the dead (…) [while] the ideal for the sake of  which 
they die remains unrealised. The eggs are broken, and the habit of  breaking them 
grows, but the omelette remains invisible”89. Many things have been done in the 
name of  civilization; sadly, among them such grave matters as war, conquest, and 
colonialism. If  the aim of  the civilization project is an omelette, then one cannot 
help but feel that the result is something more like scrambled eggs.
88  Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (London: Fontana, 1991), 15.
89  Ibid., 16.
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